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I. Introduction 
After penalties and goals, red cards are the next most significant event that can impact the 
outcome of a soccer (football) game.1 They are both dramatic and potentially game 
changing and they aren't quite as rare as we may imagine.2 While everyone understands 
the circumstantial effect of red cards – the immediate loss of a player – statistical analysis 
helps us better understand the extent to which teams are impacted when they receive a red 
card. This is more so as it remains unclear whether a sending-off of a player actually turns 
out to be a punishment for the penalized team, or if - as a popular soccer myth states – 
penalized teams perform better than they would have performed, had they not received a 
red card.3 
There are many instances where a red card can change the momentum of a game.4 How a 
team reacts to getting a red card can influence the final score in the game.5 This paper will 
                                                          
1 While soccer is the popular name of the game in North America, it is known as football in the rest 
of the world. In this paper, the two terms will be used interchangeably. 
2 On average, around 15% of matches in the English Premier League in a given year feature one or 
more red cards, so statistically speaking we are more likely to see a red card than a 1-1 draw. 
 
3 In this paper, we use red card and sending-off interchangeably. 
4 A perfect example of how a red card affects the game can be seen when analyzing a recent 
Champions League second-leg game between Manchester United and Real Madrid. Manchester 
United were controlling the game – United nullified Madrid’s potent attack by using Danny Welbeck 
to restrict Madrid’s most creative player Xabi Alonso – after Sergio Ramos had scored an own goal 
to give the Manchester United a 2-1 lead. However, the game turned when United winger Nani was 
sent off for a dangerous challenge at 56 minutes. Not only did United have a man less, they also had 
to move Welbeck to left midfield, in order to preserve their mid-field – allowing Alonso to roam free 
and become more creative. Known for reacting to situations quickly, it took Madrid’s manager Jose 
Mourinho just four minutes to make a substitution – replacing Alvaro Arbeloa with Luka Modric, 
and swapping Sami Khedira to right back. The change turned the game as Modric controlled the 
center of midfield with intricate passing sequences, and scored the equalizer with a long-range 
strike. After equalizing, Real Madrid continued with their attack, scoring their second goal within 13 
minutes of Nani’s red card.  
5 Over the 60 English Premier League games where a team saw a red card in 2012-13 season, 20% 
dropped points at the final whistle when compared to their predicted points (based on the score 
prior to sending off). For the 20 teams that were drawing at the time of receiving a red card in 
2012-13 Premier League, 65 percent went on to lose, 30 percent held on for a draw and just 5 
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attempt to estimate the impact of a red card on both the home team and the visiting team 
using an extensive data set from the English Premier League for the seasons 1992-93 to 
2012-13. The results show that a team with a red card suffers by scoring less goals than 
they would have done had they kept a full complement of players on the pitch and they also 
concede more goals than would have otherwise. In other words, we do not find support for 
the myth that ‘ten is better than eleven’ in a soccer game. 
There have been some attempts in the literature to estimate the effects of red cards in 
soccer.  Using data from the Dutch professional soccer league from 1989 to 1992, Ridder et 
al (1994) find that red cards have a negative impact on team performance. Carmichael and 
Thomas (2005) also analyze the effects of sending-offs using data from the 1997-98 season 
of the English Premier League and find that the expulsion of a player is less costly to 
visiting teams than to home teams. They argue that visiting teams, who - in many cases - 
play more defensively, are better able to accommodate to the disadvantage of having one 
less player. Caliendo and Radic (2006) focus on FIFA World Cup matches from 1930 to 
2002. Their results show no support for the ‘‘ten do it better’’ myth. However, they show 
that if a sending-off takes place in the second half of the match, the ten players do not at 
least perform worse.  
Using a data set containing German Bundesliga matches with at least one red card between 
1963 and 2004, Bar-Eli et al (2006) show that an expulsion weakens the team and that its 
scoring and winning chances decrease. They also find that home teams are more likely to 
score the first goal after a sending-off. As a number of studies including Carmichael and 
Thomas (2005) suggest, home teams are in general more likely to win matches. Therefore, 
the findings of Bar-Eli et al. (2006) do not necessarily indicate an effect of red cards as 
matches without a sending-off should also be taken into account to control for selection 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
percent – one team – managed to win. Unsurprisingly, the team that had a player sent off gained 
fewer points per game.  During the 2012-13 season, the average time for each dismissal was 56 
minutes and the average number of goals scored after the dismissal was 1.15 with the team down 
to 10 men averaging 0.38 goals and the team with 11 men averaging 0.77 goals. The team with the 
red card contributed 33 percent of the goals. 
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bias. Using data from the Bundesliga, Anders and Rotthoff (2011) analyze the effects of 
yellow and red cards on the probability of victory for a team and find that the probability of 
a win decreases for the team that receives a yellow or red card. 
 
Mechtel et al (2011) use data from the German Bundesliga for the seasons 1999-2000 to 
2008-09 to show that the key factors explaining the status of a match following a sending-
off are the strength of each team, the remaining time to go, the home team’s specific home 
advantage, and whether the penalized team is playing a home game. A sending-off always 
has a negative impact on a home team’s performance, whereas the effects of a sending-off 
against a guest team crucially depend on the time left in the match. Titman et al. (2012) 
show that teams playing against a red-carded rival benefited by a 64.5 percent scoring rate 
increase. Previous research looking at a number of English Premier League seasons also 
indicates that the longer teams have a player deficit, the worse off they will be.6 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the theoretical underpinnings of the 
paper while Section III presents the data and the model. The estimation results are 
discussed in Section IV. The paper ends with concluding remarks in Section V. 
 
II. Theoretical Underpinnings 
A red card is shown by a referee to signify that a player has been sent off.7 A player who has 
been sent off is required to leave the field of play immediately and must take no further 
                                                          
6 If a team receives a red card in the first minute, their average goal difference in the game would be 
reduced by about 1.5 goals. This is reduced to 0.85 and 0.62 if a team is affected by a red card at 
half-time and 60 minutes, respectively. 
 
7 It was not until 1982 that the use of red card became compulsory in every football game. During 
the 1966 World Cup quarter-finals between Argentina and England, English referee Ken Aston 
observed that, due to the absence of a common language, German referee Rudolf Keitlin had a hard 
time telling Argentine striker Antonio Rattin that he wants the player out of the game. Aston 
thought that there must be a refereeing signal that is clear and understandable to all and later came 
up with the use of yellow and red card based on traffic light colors. After a trial in the Olympic 
soccer games of 1968, the yellow and red cards were first used in the 1970 FIFA World Cup 
tournament. 
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part in the game.  Contrary to, for example, hockey or handball, the player who has been 
sent off cannot be replaced during the game; his team must continue the game with one 
less player.8 A red card will be shown to a player who has committed a serious offence such 
as violent conduct or an illegal and purposeful obstruction of a goal scoring opportunity for 
the opposing team. It is also shown to a player who accumulates two yellow cards for more 
minor offenses.9 
This paper will follow the theoretical underpinnings of a red card as developed in Mechtel 
et al (2011). A team in a soccer game consists of different team members having to 
cooperate to achieve their common target - to score goals and to win a match. Following 
Belbin (2004), it can be argued that in a soccer team, each player has a specific functional 
role, for example, goalkeepers, defenders, midfielders, or strikers.  The team manager or 
coach forms the team with the optimal combination of players and functional roles at the 
beginning of the match and constantly optimizes the team’s composition regarding players’ 
abilities and roles. Consequently, a sending-off will lead to a suboptimal composition of the 
team (Belbin, 2004), which in turn will result in a lower ability to perform (Ancona & 
Caldwell, 1992; Lazear, 1999). The remaining ten players have to cope with the situation by 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
8 Only players, substitutes and substituted players may receive a red card. If a goalkeeper receives a 
red card another player will be allowed to assume goalkeeping duties (teams will usually substitute 
an outfield player for another goalkeeper if this option is available). 
 
9 Law 12 of the Laws of the Game lists the categories of misconduct for which a player may be sent 
off. These are: serious foul play (a violent foul); violent conduct (any other act of violence) e.g. 
assaulting the referee; Spitting at anyone or another player; a deliberate handling offense to deny 
an obvious goal-scoring opportunity by any player other than a goalkeeper in his own penalty area; 
committing an offence that denies an opponent an obvious goal-scoring opportunity (informally 
known as a professional foul); using offensive, insulting or abusive language or gestures; and 
receiving a second caution (yellow card) in the same game. In most tournaments, a single direct red 
card (i.e. not one received as a result of two successive yellow ones) results in disqualification of the 
offending player for one or more of subsequent matches, the exact number of matches varying by 
the offence committed and by jurisdiction. Should a team's on-field players receive a total of five 
red cards, they will be unable to field the required minimum of seven players and the match will be 
abandoned. 
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compensating for the missing player. Mechtel et al (2011) argues that at least some players 
have to fulfill not only their own functional role but also parts of the role of the penalized 
player. Given this reasoning, the role effect on the performance of the penalized team 
should be negative. Thus, Mechtel et al (2011) pose the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1 ‘‘role effect’’: A sending-off affects the performance of the penalized team 
negatively. 
However, we cannot ignore the motivational aspects of a sending-off. Latane´ (1973) in his 
theory of social impact suggests that group size is negatively correlated with the outside 
pressure felt by group members. The smaller a group becomes, the more the perceived 
pressure increases. As sending-off reduces the size of the penalized team, the social impact 
theory can be used to suggest that the sending-off increases the perceived pressure on the 
remaining players, inducing higher effort levels. As performance should be positively 
affected by player effort, we expect a positive motivation effect on the performance of the 
reduced team. Thus, we can make a case for the common myth that ten players perform 
better than eleven. This leads to the second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2 ‘‘motivation effect’’: A sending-off affects the performance of the penalized team 
positively. 
 
In soccer, the two competing teams can be classified as either the home or the visiting 
team. Empirically, the tasks of the home and the visiting teams are different, though of 
course both teams have to concur with the rules of soccer and share the objective of 
winning the match. Home teams usually choose a more offensive strategy than visiting 
teams (Carmichael and Thomas, 2005). The visiting teams’ defensive strategy might be 
conceived as less complex than the home teams’ offensive strategy because the latter 
represents a constant struggle for a balance between scoring and not letting the other team 
counterattack. 
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Given this reasoning, Mechtel et al (2011) argue that the home team faces a more complex 
task. Task complexity influences how fast a penalized team can adapt to the change in 
functional roles. The higher the task complexity, the more difficult is the adjustment of the 
play to a sending-off. Assuming that the home team has to perform the more complex task, 
the performance of a penalized home team will suffer more from a sending-off than that of 
a penalized visiting team. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3 ‘‘task effect’’: A sending-off has larger negative effects on the performance of the 
penalized team whenever it is the home team. 
 
III. Data and Model 
The paper tests for the three hypotheses proposed in Mechtel et al (2011), and discussed in 
the previous Section, using data from the English Premier League for the seasons 1992-93 
to 2012-13.10 Data are downloaded from  http://soccernet-akamai.espn.go.com and 
http://www.myfootballfacts.com/. At the top of the English football (soccer) league 
system, the Premier League is the country's primary soccer competition.11 It was formed on 
20 February 1992 following the decision of soccer clubs to break away from The Football 
League, which was originally founded in 1888, and take advantage of a lucrative television 
rights deal. The league held its first season in 1992–93 participated by 22 clubs.12 
                                                          
10 It is currently sponsored by Barclays Bank and thus officially known as the Barclays Premier 
League. 
 
11 The Premier League is the most-watched football league in the world, broadcast in 212 territories 
to 643 million homes and a potential TV audience of 4.7 billion people. In the 2010–11 season the 
average Premier League match attendance was 35,363, the second highest of any professional 
football league behind the German Bundesliga, and stadium occupancy was 92.2% capacity. Over 13 
million spectators attended Premier League games during the 2012-13 season. 
12 The 22 inaugural members of the new Premier League were Arsenal, Aston Villa, Blackburn Rovers, 
Chelsea, Coventry City, Crystal Palace, Everton, Ipswich Town, Leeds United, Liverpool, Manchester City, 
Manchester United, Middlesbrough, Norwich City, Nottingham Forest, Oldham Athletic, Queens Park 
Rangers, Sheffield United, Sheffield Wednesday, Southampton, Tottenham Hotspur, and Wimbledon. 
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Currently, contested by 20 clubs, it operates on a system of promotion and relegation. 
Seasons run from August to May, with each team playing the others twice (a double round-
robin system), once at their home stadium and once at that of their opponents, for a total of 
38 games each, totaling 380 matches in the season.13 
Teams receive three points for a win and one point for a draw. No points are awarded for a 
loss. Teams are ranked by total points, then goal difference, and then goals scored. At the 
end of each season, the club with the most points is crowned champion. If points are equal, 
the goal difference and then goals scored determine the winner. If still equal, teams are 
deemed to occupy the same position. If there is a tie for the championship, for relegation, or 
for qualification to other competitions, a play-off match at a neutral venue decides rank. 
The three lowest placed teams are relegated into the Football League Championship,  
and the top two teams from the Championship, together with the winner of play-offs 
involving the third to sixth placed Championship clubs, are promoted in their place.14 Table 
A1 in the Appendix provides a detail list of performance by various teams in the English 
Premier League during the 1992-93 to 2012-13 sample period.  
Table 1 provides a detail list of red and yellow cards given in the English Premier League 
during the 1992-93 to 2012-13 seasons. The number of red cards varied from a low of 33 in 
the 1993-94 season to 75 in the 2005-6 season. The average number of red cards given in 
any season is …. Table 2 provides a team wise breakdown of red and yellow cards. Among 
reams that played in the Premier League during the entire 21 years sample period, Everton 
got the highest number of red cards (74) followed by Arsenal (69). Among all teams, 
Blackburn Rovers got the highest number of red cards (75) although they played only 18 
seasons. 
                                                          
13 Each team played forty-two games per season during 1992-93 to 1994-95. 
14 Of the 46 clubs to have competed since the inception of the Premier League in 1992, five have 
won the title: Manchester United (13), Arsenal (3), Chelsea (3), Blackburn Rovers (1) and 
Manchester City (1). 
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The increasing popularity of soccer modelling and prediction in recent years is mainly due 
to two reasons (Karlis and Ntzoufras, 2009). First, the soccer market has expanded 
considerably in the past years; modern soccer teams are profitable companies usually with 
large investments and budgets, and a large base of fans. Second, the amount spent on 
bettings has increased dramatically, especially in Europe. As a result, the demand for 
models which provide good predictions for the outcome of a soccer match has increased. 
 
In the literature on modeling soccer match outcomes, two measures of team performance 
are usually proposed. The goals-based approach analyses the number of goals scored and 
conceded by each team, whereas the result-based approach usually uses the categories of 
win, draw, and loss to model a match’s outcome. Within the first approach, the Poisson 
distribution has been found to be appropriate for describing the number of goals scored by 
two competing teams (see, e.g., Dixon & Coles, 1997; Lee, 1997; Maher, 1982; Rue & 
Salvesen, 2000).  
 
In the second approach, the match’s result is modeled in terms of win, draw, or loss. Here, 
the outcome of a match is a discrete variable with a natural ordering that can only take on 
three values. Ordered logit or ordered probit models are typically used (see, e.g., Audas, 
Dobson, & Goddard, 2002; Bar-Eli et al., 2006; Goddard & Asimakopoulos, 2004; Koning, 
2000; Kuypers, 2000). 
 
Goddard (2005) provides an empirical comparison between the goals-based approach and 
the result-based approach and finds the differences between the results of the two 
approaches to be rather small. For our analysis, we consider whether the outcome is a win, 
draw, or loss from a home team’s perspective. Here an ordered logit or probit estimation is 
the preferred estimation strategy due to the few-values-taking natural ordering of 
alternatives (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). This discrete structure of the dependent variable 
could render Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation, as the standard method for 
estimations with a metric dependent variable, inappropriate.  
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Given the discrete, ordinal nature of the dependent variable, we use the ordered logit 
method for our estimation (see Greene, 2011 for details).15 We implicitly model factors 
influencing the outcome of a match by defining a latent variable y*, say an unobserved 
measure of team strength, which crosses progressively higher thresholds αi. For each 
match i, we specify  
    y*i = x’iβ + ɛi 
where β and xi represent the respective vectors of coefficients and regressors (without an 
intercept), and  ɛi the error term. For very low y*, the outcome variable takes the lowest 
observable value, whereas whenever y* crosses an  αi the outcome variable increases by 
+1. Given our data, we have m = 3 (win–draw–lose), where we define 
yi = j    if αj-1< y*i<αj, j = 1…m, 
 where α0 = 0 and αm = +2, respectively.  
  
We maximize the log likelihood of  
  Pr[yi = j] = F(αj - xJiβ) – F(αj-1 – xJiβ) 
where F is the cumulative distribution function of ɛi. The sign of the regression parameters, 
β can be immediately interpreted as determining whether the latent variable, y*, increases 
with the regressor. 
IV. Empirical Results 
The basic model takes the following form: 
Outcomeis = β1SOHomeis + β2SOVisitoris + ɛis 
where Outcomeis  is defined in terms of win, draw, and loss from the home team’s 
perspective for match i in season s.   SOHomeis and SOVisitoris are dummy variables taking 
the value of 1 if a player of the home team, or respectively, the visiting team, is sent-off 
during the game (and 0 otherwise).  
 
                                                          
15 Estimation using ordered probit produces similar results. The degree of excess of our dependent 
variable … is 22.8/1.482 – 3 = 7.4, suggesting that the use of the (leptokurtic) logistic distribution is 
more appropriate. 
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The results for the basic model are given in Columns 1 in Table 3. The coefficients for both 
dummy variables are statistically significant. We find that a red card against the home team 
is correlated with a worse match outcome from the home team’s perspective. Similarly, a 
red card against the visiting team is also correlated with a worse result from the visiting 
team’s point of view, as the dependent variable is defined from the home teams’ 
perspective. 
 
Next, we introduce and include various control variables in the basic model. An important 
factor affecting a soccer match’s result is the strength of each team. We incorporate control 
variables for each team’s strength and interpret team strength not as the performance of 
the team on the day but as the overall strength during the season s. However, the problem 
with this measure is that the outcome of each match we analyze influences this measure. 
To avoid this endogeneity problem, we take the average of a team’s total points in the final 
table earned in season s and s-1. Column 2 in Table 3  show the ordered logit regression 
results when augmenting our basic model with team strength variables (Strength home 
(points) and Strength visitor (points)). With respect to the impact of team strength, we find 
that stronger teams perform better. However, we do not find substantial changes in the 
correlation between a sending-off and a match’s outcome in comparison to our basic 
model. The effects are still significant at the 1% level for both teams. 
 
One particularly important factor in soccer is the existence of a home advantage.16 As the 
supporters want to help their team and intimidate the opponent team, it would be useful to 
                                                          
16 Studies highlight that the probability of receiving a red card is different between home and 
visiting teams. Data collected from the Champions League during 2002-2007 show that in only 24.3 
percent of games did the home team incur more yellow cards than the visiting team. During that 
period home teams received a red card in 6.42 percent of games, while the visiting teams received 
them in 11.82 percent of games. This means that visiting teams picked up red cards 84 percent 
more often than home sides. Interestingly, in 82.89 percent of games there were no red cards. 
Research on the Bundesliga (Anders & Rotthoff, 2010) from 2004 to 2009 highlight that the effect 
of cards on the home team is different to that of the visiting side. Titman et al. (2012) find that a 
home red card increases a visiting teams’ scoring rate by 60 percent and decreases the home sides’ 
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test whether there is a ‘‘supporters effect’’ on the outcome of a match. One way to measure 
this is to include total number of attendance in a game. It can be safely assumed that the 
majority of these attendees are supporter of the home team. The result in Column 3 shows 
that attendance does have a statistically significant impact on the final outcome of a match. 
The larger the number of attendees in a soccer game (assuming majority of them are 
supporters of the home team), the better their result in the particular match. In other 
words, the enthusiasm of the home team supporters help to motivate the home team. This 
is unlike the results reported in Mechtel et al (2011) who found attendance to have no 
impact on the performance of the home team. 
 
Caliendo and Radic (2006) examine another important factor for the effect of a sending-off: 
the time to go until the end of the match. To control for this time aspect, we implement two 
additional variables, where we interact the sending-off dummy variables with the 
remaining time in the match when the sending-off occurs (SOHome *Min to go and 
SOVisitor *Min to go). The results in Column 4 in Table 3 show that both these variables are 
statistically insignificant. Taken together, the results imply that it doesn’t matter when a 
team gets the red card, it will make the penalized team worse off. The results are robust 
irrespective of whether the penalized team is the home or visiting team. 
 
Another important control variable is the score at the minute of occurrence (standing). 
However, including the standing by itself as a control variable implicitly imposes the notion 
that the standing would have the same impact on the match’s outcome in different minutes 
in the match. Clearly, this is not the case. A 2-0 in the 75th minute has a larger impact on 
the result than a 2-0 in the 35th minute. In order to take this into account, we use six 
dummy variables sixth for each sixth (minute 1-15, 16-30, 31-45, 46-60, 61-75, and 76-90) 
of a match taking the value of 1 whenever there has been a sending-off in this sixth (and 0 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
scoring rate by 17 percent. In comparison, a red card for the visiting team sees the home team’s 
chances of scoring increase by 69 percent and the visiting team’s chances decrease by a massive 42 
percent, which shows the handicap for visiting teams is more severe. 
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otherwise). We interact each of these dummy variables with SOStanding– the standing in 
terms of win–draw–loss. This results in six interaction terms that are 0 in sixths without a 
sending-off and take the value of the standing in sixths with a sending-off. By including 
these SOStanding * sixth interaction terms in our empirical model, we control for the score 
before the sending-off and, thereby, switch off a possible reverse causality effect. 
 
The results can be seen in columns 4 and 5 in Table 3. The coefficient of the dummy 
variable for a home team sending-off remains negative and significant at the 1% level. The 
guest team dummy variable is positive and statistically significant. From the home team’s 
perspective this indicates that a red card against the guest team leads to a score that is 
better for the home team.  So the team that is penalized by a red card ends up worse off 
irrespective of whether it is the home or the guest team. Additionally, many of the six 
control variables taking into account the score at the minute of the sending-off are 
significant and have the expected signs: the standing in the match is positively correlated 
with the final score or result. 
 
In columns 5 of Table 3 we also include control variables for information on each team’s 
performance during the match. In the literature, a number of such performance indicators 
have been used, such as, the number of goal attempts, corners, and yellow cards per team. 
As we use the team strength variables to control for strength within the season, one might 
argue that we should also control for each team’s strength within the particular game. We 
use the number of corners taken by each team  to measure team performance. Both turn 
out to be highly significant and to have the expected sign. The team who can force more 
corner kicks appear to perform better in that particular game.17 
 
Ordered logit model uses a maximum likelihood method to accurately estimate the 
empirical model (Greene, 2011). Consequently, R-square cannot be used to measure the 
                                                          
17 We also include the number of yellow cards that a team receives in the game. But the variable 
turns out to be insignificant from both the home and visiting team’s perspective. 
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significance of the model fit. Instead, chi-square is utilized. The results in Table 3 show that 
in terms of explanatory power all the models are statistically satisfactory. The significant 
LR values indicate that the explanatory variables used in each model are all jointly 
significant. 
 
The coefficient estimates in Table 3 do not give the marginal effects of the right hand side 
variables on the probabilities of win, draw or loss. To interpret the magnitude of the 
regression parameters, we use the procedure described in Greene (2011) to calculate the 
marginal effects.18 The results are presented in Table 4. The marginal effects of dummy 
variables (such as SOHomeis) are calculated as the discrete change in y as the dummy 
variable changes from 0 to 1, while other covariates are evaluated at their mean. We find 
that a sending-off against the home team (SOHome) leads to a .0415 lower probability for 
the home team to win the match.  A sending-off against the visiting team increases the 
probability for the home team to win by .0583. In addition, a sending-off against the home 
team makes a draw or a defeat of the home team more likely.  
 
V. Further Analysis 
Another variable of interest is the yellow card. As yellow cards increase during a game, the 
in-play probability of a player being dismissed grows. Titman et al. (2012) stated a yellow 
card to any player on a team in the Premier League more than doubles the hazard of a 
straight red card to any other player on that team. Interestingly, Titman et al (2012) also 
discovered that a team’s booking rate increases by 25% if the opposing team receives a 
yellow card, which reinforces the notion that referees have a tendency to ‘even up’ 
decisions during the game. However, in our estimation, the yellow card variable is 
insignificant in all cases. 
                                                          
18 The marginal effect shows the probability to choosing alternative j when regressor xr changes. 
See Greene (2011) for a description of how the marginal effects are calculated.  
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Recent statistics has shown that in the English Premier League, approximately 45% of goals 
come before the interval and 55% afterwards. In fact if we plot the number of goals scored 
in various 10 minute segments over the course of a contest we will find that the later 
segments see more goals than the earlier ones. In short, the rate of goal scoring increases 
with time. Statistics also shows that over the last 6 seasons one average dismissal occurred 
just after the 60th minute and the average change in goal difference amounted to 0.61 of a 
goal. About 64% of the 0.61 difference occurred because the side with 11 players scored 
more than they would have expected to score prior to the card and the rest came about by 
the infringing side scoring less. 
An analysis of the 2011-12 Premier League season shows that  there were over 60 matches 
featuring a red card and the overall share of the league points for the carded side fell from 
nearly 40% just prior to the card to only 20% at the final whistle. Blackburn turned a 2-1 
deficit against Wigan into a 3-3 despite being reduced to ten men after 48 minutes, but this 
was a rarity overall. A much more typical outcome concerns the fate of the 20 sides which 
were drawing when one of their players was red carded. 13 went onto lose, six hung on for 
a draw and one (Blackburn again) managed a win. 
So the general case firmly belies the often repeated footballing cliché that playing against 
ten men is more difficult than when a team faces eleven opponents. It may require a 
different tactical approach, but the final result is more often a favorable one. 
Using data from multiple Premiership seasons and extrapolating across the ninety minutes 
of a game indicates that a team which receives a red card in the first minute should expect 
to see their average goal difference in such matches reduced by about 1.5 goals, both 
through lack of firepower and an increased tendency to concede. If the card is delayed until 
half time, the cost to the recipient is 0.85 of a goal and by an hour in it has further fallen to 
0.62 of a goal. 
So how do the three hypotheses developed at the beginning of the paper play out in the 
English Premier League? First, we find support for the ‘role effect’ hypothesis, that is, the 
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sending-offs negatively affect the performance of the penalized team. For both the 
penalized home and visiting teams, we find a highly significant negative effect of a red card, 
no matter when the sending-off occurs. Assuming that the team is composed optimally at 
the beginning of the match, a sending-off weakens the team, as a player specialized in a 
certain position is excluded from the match. 
 
Second, we do not find any support for the ‘motivation effect’. Getting a red card didn’t 
increase the perceived pressure on the remaining players inducing higher effort levels. This 
is true for both the home and the visiting teams. Thus we do not find any support for the 
soccer myth that ‘ten do it better’. 
VI. Conclusion 
An analysis of the data on red cards shown in the English Premier League during the 1991-
92 to 2012-2013 seasons contradict the repeated soccer cliché that playing against ten men 
is more difficult than eleven. As with goals, red cards are rare, but potent occurrences. 
Occasionally, a depleted team will produce a seemingly improved performance by grabbing 
a draw or an unexpected win, but in the long run a red card reduces the expected number 
of points a team would have hoped to gain had they kept eleven men on the pitch. Teams 
receiving a red card suffer both through scoring less goals than expected after the card and 
conceding more. 
The real significance of the red card is that, whereas goals are real and show up on the 
scoreboard, a red card merely presents an opportunity and a challenge to the respective 
teams. Over many repetitions a team will benefit from facing a diminished opponent, but 
over a limited trial of a single match there still exists both the need to exploit their 
advantage and the small possibility that long term expectation will succumb to short term 
variation. 
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Table 1: Statistics on Red and Yellow Cards and Premier League Champions and Runners-Up 
 
Season   Red Cards    Yellow Cards  Champion  Runners-Up               
2012-13      52       1178  Manchester United  Manchester City 
2011-12      66       1154  Manchester City  Manchester United 
2010-11      64       1237  Manchester City  Chelsea 
2009-10      68       1235  Chelsea    Manchester United 
2008-09      63       1192  Manchester United  Liverpool 
2007-08      61       1210  Manchester United  Chelsea 
2006-07      53       1222  Manchester United  Chelsea 
2005-06      75       1171  Chelsea    Manchester United 
2004-05      60       1031  Chelsea    Arsenal 
2003-04      56       1133  Arsenal    Chelsea 
2002-03      71       1155  Manchester United   Arsenal 
2001-02      66       1090  Arsenal    Liverpool 
2000-01      64       1208  Manchester United  Arsenal 
1999-2000      68       1300  Manchester United  Arsenal 
1998-99      73         1416  Manchester United  Arsenal 
1997-98      69       1264  Arsenal    Manchester United 
1996-97      43       1184  Manchester United  Newcastle United 
1995-96      59        383  Manchester United  NewCastle United 
1994-95      71       1308  Blackburn Rovers  Blackburn Rovers 
1993-94      33        661  Manchester United  Blackburn Rovers 
1992-93      35        795  Manchester United  Ashton Villa 
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Table 2: Team-wise Breakdown of Red and Yellow Cards 
         No. of years in 
Team    Red Cards Yellow Cards Premier League during sample period 
 
Arsenal*        69       1151    21 
Ashton Villa*        47       1122    21 
Barnslay         5           65      1 
Birmingham City       26         431      7 
Blackburn Rovers       75       1090    18 
Blackpool          2           47      1 
Bolton Wanderers       43        815    13 
Bradford City          2          98      2 
Burnley          2          57       1 
Charlton Athletic       21        404      8 
Chelsea*        64      1237    21 
Coventry City        23        441      9 
Crystal Palace        10       208      4 
Derby County        16       522      7 
Everton*        74      1180    21 
Fulham         34       646    12 
Hull City          9       136     2 
Ipswich Town         6       183     5 
Leeds United       27       737    12 
Leicester City       28       454     8 
Liverpool*       47       977    21 
Manchester City      56       863    16 
Manchester United*      52     1045    21 
Middlesbrough       44       858    14 
Newcastle United      62     1028    18 
Norwich City       11       268     6 
Nottingham Forest       9       247     5 
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Table 2: Team-wise Breakdown of Red and Yellow Cards (Continued) 
         No. of years in 
Team    Red Cards Yellow Cards Premier League during sample period 
 
Oldham Athletic       4         69     2  
Portsmouth       20       404     7 
Queens Park Rangers      23       273     6 
Reading         9       145     3 
Sheffield United      10       164     3 
Sheffield Wednesday      20       326     8 
Southampton       37       721    14 
Stoke City       18       347     5 
Sunderland       47       805    12 
Swansea City        4        98     2 
Swindon Town        2        38     1 
Tottenham Hotspur*      54     1105    21 
Watford        6       116     2 
West Bromwich Albion      24       371     7 
West Ham United       60      1080      17 
Wigan Athletic       28        515     8 
Wimbledon       28        380     8 
Wolverhampton Wanderers     12        260     4 
---------------------------------- 
Teams with * = ever present in Premier League 
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Table 3:  Ordered Logit Regression Results 
Variables  __(1)___     __(2)___ __(3)___ __(4)___ __(5)___ 
SOHome  -0.465      -0.428 -0.390  -0.358  -0.490 
   (3.88)       (3.70) (3.66)  (2.69)  (3.96) 
SOVisitor  0.332       0.311 0.245    0.370  (0.412) 
   (2.90)       (2.45) (2.32)  (3.94)  (4.36) 
Strength Home            0.236 0.377  0.568  0.373 
          (4.18) (5.10)  (6.22)  (5.19) 
Strength Visitor        -0.280 -0.144  -0.285  -0.243 
         (5.38) (3.84)  (5.83)  (5.13) 
Attendance      0.640  0.857   0.758 
       (7.45)  (8.04)  (6.85) 
SOHome * Min to go       0.078  0.066 
          (1.32)  (1.64) 
SOVisitor * Min to go        0.056  0.037 
         (1.18)  (0.79) 
SOStanding * 1st Sixth       -0.344  -0.327 
          (1.60)  (1.77) 
SOStanding * 2nd Sixth       -0.425  -0.419 
         (1.56)  (1.77) 
SOStanding * 3rd Sixth       -0.740  -0.566 
         (1.58)  (1.68) 
SOStanding * 4th Sixth       0.644  0.380 
         (2.96)  (3.46) 
SOStanding * 5th Sixth       0.768  0.664 
         (3.65)  (4.80) 
SOStanding * 6th Sixth       1.005  0.988 
         (5.15)  (6.12) 
Home corner attempts         0.866 
           (4.12) 
Visitor corner attempts         -0.530 
           (5.99) 
 
Log likelihood  -2065.2  -2610.4        -3145.4  -3664.8  -4327.4 
Pseudo R2  0.21  0.22         0.25  0.27  0.28 
Chi-square for covariates 17.34  20.11         22.98  40.66  43.95 
 (degrees of freedom)     (2)    (4)           (5)    (13)    (15) 
 
(t--statistics in parentheses) 
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Table 4: Marginal Effect of Ordered Logit Regression 
 
 
Variables   Home Victory  Draw   Away Victory 
 
SOHome   -0.0415 (6.10)  0.0212 (4.15)  0.0393 (5.40) 
   
SOVisitor   -0.0583 (3.44)  0.0862 (5.88)  0.0418 (6.18) 
    
Strength Home     0.0166 (8.15)  -0.0365 (3.87)  -0.0403 (5.11) 
                 
Strength Visitor   -0.0112 (6.38)  0.0562 (4.10)  0.0982 (4.33) 
 
Attendance   -0.0254 (3.90)  -0.0201 (3.18)  -0.0636 (5.10) 
 
SOHome * Min to go  0.0241 (4.65)  0.0434 (4.18)  0.0592 (3.10) 
 
SOVisitor * Min to go  -0.0908 (5.40)  -0.0668 (5.11)  -0.0702 (8.19)  
          
SOStanding * 1st Sixth  0.0854 (1.13)  0.0406 (1.33)  0.0085 (1.00) 
 
SOStanding * 2nd Sixth  0.0095 (1.04)  0.0285 (1.56)  0.0073 (0.92) 
 
SOStanding * 3rd Sixth  0.0132 (1.19)  0.0313 (1.18)  0.0065 (1.03)  
       
SOStanding * 4th Sixth  0.0361 (3.94)  0.0358 (3.34)  0.0292 (1.80) 
 
SOStanding * 5th Sixth  0.0523 (5.05)  0.0498 (3.99)  0.0380 (1.98)  
      
SOStanding * 6th Sixth  0.0966 (6.20)  0.0965 (4.73)  0.0514 (2.95) 
 
Home corner attempts  0.0244 (3.62)  0.0155 (3.15)  0.0136 (2.80)  
  
Visitor corner attempts  -0.0036 (2.14)  -0.0084 (2.62)  -0.0040 (3.10)  
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Appendix Table A1: Premier League Club Statistics 1992-93 to 2012-13. 
Pos. Club Seasons Pld W D L GF GA GD Pts        
1 Manchester United  21 810 528 168 114 1627 703 924 1752        
2 Arsenal 21 810 436 214 160 1417 754 663 1522        
3 Chelsea 21 810 423 208 179 1357 780 577 1477        
4 Liverpool  21 810 396 207 207 1307 796 511 1395        
5 Tottenham Hotspur  21 810 315 213 282 1138 1066 72 1158        
6 Aston Villa 21 810 292 248 270 1020 992 28 1124        
7 Everton 21 810 288 233 289 1029 1019 10 1097        
8 Newcastle United  19 730 288 194 248 1041 953 88 1058        
9 Blackburn Rovers  18 696 262 184 250 927 907 20 970        
10 Manchester City  16 620 234 160 226 837 769 67 862        
11 West Ham United  17 654 214 168 272 768 933 −165 810        
12 Leeds United  12 468 189 125 154 641 573 68 692        
13 Middlesbrough  14 536 160 156 220 621 741 −120 633[7]        
14 Southampton  14 544 159 151 234 647 798 −151 628        
15 Bolton Wanderers  13 494 149 128 217 575 745 −170 575        
16 Fulham 12 456 141 131 187 530 612 −82 554        
17 Sunderland 12 456 121 116 219 463 660 −197 479        
18 Coventry City 9 354 99 112 143 387 490 −103 409        
19 Sheffield Wednesday 8 316 101 89 126 409 453 −44 392        
20 Wimbledon 8 316 99 94 123 384 472 −88 391        
21 Charlton Athletic 8 304 93 82 129 342 442 −100 361        
22 Leicester City 8 308 84 90 134 354 456 −102 342        
23 Wigan Athletic  8 304 85 76 143 316 482 −166 331        
24 Birmingham City 7 266 73 82 111 273 360 −87 301        
25 Portsmouth 7 266 79 65 122 292 380 −88 293[8]        
26 Norwich City 6 240 72 76 92 298 381 −83 292        
27 Queens Park Rangers  6 240 73 59 108 297 358 −61 278        
28 Derby County 7 266 68 70 128 271 420 −149 274        
29 West Bromwich Albion 7 266 66 67 133 286 431 −145 265        
30 Nottingham Forest  5 198 60 59 79 229 287 −58 239        
31 Stoke City 5 190 56 57 77 188 249 −61 225        
32 Ipswich Town  5 202 57 53 92 219 312 −93 224        
33 Crystal Palace  4 160 37 49 74 160 243 −83 160        
34 Wolverhampton Wanderers  4 152 32 40 80 156 281 −125 136        
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Pos. Club Seasons Pld W D L GF GA GD Pts        
35 Sheffield United  3 122 32 36 54 128 168 −40 132        
36 Reading 3 114 32 23 59 136 186 −50 119        
37 Swansea City 2 76 23 24 29 91 102 -11 93 
     
  
38 Oldham Athletic 2 84 22 23 39 105 142 −37 89 
    
   
39 Hull City 2 76 14 23 39 73 139 −66 65 
    
   
40 Bradford City 2 76 14 20 42 68 138 −70 62 
    
   
41 Watford 2 76 11 19 46 64 136 −72 52 
    
   
42 Blackpool  1 38 10 9 19 55 78 -23 39 
    
   
43 Barnsley 1 38 10 5 23 37 82 −45 35 
    
   
44 Burnley 1 38 8 6 24 42 82 −40 30 
    
   
45 Swindon Town 1 42 5 15 22 47 100 −53 30 
    
   
46 Cardiff City 0 27 5 7 15 19 48 -29 22 
     
  
Source: http://www.soccerstats.com/latest.asp?league=england 
 
 25 
 
 
 
